The Paycheck That Went to Someone Else's Bank

Team Neuron·
A stack of sealed pay envelopes on a worn wooden counter by a plant time clock, one envelope pulled slightly out of line and lying apart from the rest, early morning light through a dusty window.

It is the Monday after a long weekend. Your office manager opens an email from one of your field foremen. He has switched banks, and could his next paycheck go to the new account? The details are right there. The email has his name on it, and it reads the way he writes.

She updates the record in the payroll system. It takes two minutes. It is the kind of thing she does a few times a month.

Two Fridays later, the foreman walks into the office and asks why his pay never landed. He never sent that email. The money went to an account a stranger opened for this one job, and it is already gone.

Why payroll is an easy target

Most fraud training focuses on vendor invoices and wire transfers. Those are the big numbers, and finance teams have learned to slow down around them. Payroll feels different. A direct deposit change is small, it is routine, and it comes from someone you know.

That is exactly why it works. The IRS lists payroll schemes among the threats it wants businesses watching for. In its October 2026 reminder to businesses, it names "W-2 and payroll-related schemes" aimed at stealing employee information and money. It also gives the one-line answer: requests to change sensitive employee or payment details should be checked "through a trusted channel."

The timing matters too. The next few months are busy for payroll. Year-end bonuses go out, W-2 forms are due to employees by the end of January, and plenty of people genuinely do change banks or benefits in the new year. A fake request blends in with the real ones.

The two ways the money gets moved

There are two common versions. They need different fixes, so it helps to know both.

A fake request to the office

This is the version in the story above. Someone sends an email that looks like it came from an employee. Sometimes it comes from a lookalike address, such as a personal email account with the worker's name. Sometimes it comes from the employee's real work account, which someone else has broken into.

The person handling payroll has no reason to doubt it. In a 30-person company, she knows the foreman. She is trying to be helpful, not careless.

A close cousin of this scam asks for information instead of money. An email that seems to come from the owner asks HR to send over every employee's W-2. That file is worth a lot to criminals, because it holds names, addresses and Social Security numbers for everyone on staff.

Someone logs in as the employee

This version needs nobody in your office at all. Most payroll services now let employees update their own bank details through a website or app. That is convenient. It also means anyone with the employee's password can do it.

Microsoft's security researchers documented exactly this in a campaign they called "payroll pirates." The criminals sent convincing emails to steal employees' work passwords and sign-in codes. Then they logged in to the payroll website and changed where the paychecks went.

The clever part came next. They set up hidden rules in the victim's mailbox that quietly deleted the payroll system's "your bank details were changed" alert. The warning was sent. Nobody ever saw it.

That campaign hit universities, but nothing about it is specific to universities. It works against any business where staff can change their own deposit details online and the alerts go to the same inbox the criminal is already in.

What good looks like

The goal is simple. No paycheck should move to a new account on the strength of one email or one login.

Every deposit change gets confirmed in person or by phone. When a request comes in by email, whoever handles payroll calls the employee on the number already in their file. Or they ask the employee face to face. Never reply to the email, and never call a number that came with it.

A short delay before the first deposit. Even one pay cycle of overlap, where the old account still gets paid while the new one is confirmed, catches most of these. A real bank change can wait a week.

The employee hears about the change somewhere else. If your payroll service can send alerts by text message, turn that on. A text to the employee's phone is much harder for a criminal to hide than an email.

Sign-in protection on the payroll website. Ask your payroll provider whether employees can be required to use MFA (the extra code you get on your phone when you sign in). Turn it on for the admin accounts first. Microsoft's researchers noted that several of the hacked accounts in that campaign had no such protection at all.

W-2 files never leave by email. Make it a standing rule that nobody sends a full employee tax file in response to an email, no matter who it appears to come from. If the owner truly needs it, they can ask in person.

None of this needs new software. It is the same idea we covered for vendor payments in AI voice scams and accounts payable: money only moves after a check that does not rely on the request itself.

What to do about it this month

Write the rule down. One paragraph is enough: deposit changes are confirmed by phone or in person, using contact details already on file, and the first payment to a new account waits for that confirmation. Give it to everyone who can touch payroll, including a backup person who covers vacations.

Log in to your payroll service and look for two settings. One sends employees an alert when their bank details change. The other requires a sign-in code. If you cannot find them, call the provider and ask. It is a five-minute conversation.

Look at who can make changes in the payroll system as an administrator. In many small companies it is the owner, the office manager and someone who left two years ago. Remove anyone who no longer needs it. If you are not sure who holds the keys to your other business accounts, who actually owns your Microsoft 365 walks through the same question for email.

Finally, tell your employees. A two-line note works: "We will never change your direct deposit from an email alone. If you get an alert that your bank details changed and you did not do it, call the office right away." That turns every employee into an early warning.

If it does happen, move fast. Call your bank and the payroll provider the same day to try to stop or reverse the deposit. Then reset the employee's work password and check their mailbox for rules they did not create.

A low-stakes way to check

Most businesses can put these rules in place in an afternoon, and we would rather you did than waited. If you want a second opinion, our free IT assessment looks at how sign-in, email and payroll access actually work in your business today. You will get a short list of the places where one convincing email could still move someone's paycheck.